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#2A-11/21/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY SHERIFF'S EMPLOYEES' 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and-
COUNTY OF CHAUTAUQUA, 
Respondent. 
SOTIR & GOLDMAN, ESQS. (RICHARD L. SOTIR, JR. ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF LAW (MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, 
ESQ., DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY, of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the County of 
Chautauqua (County) to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision 
which held that the County violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
implemented a directive that a contractually authorized meal 
allowance would not be reimbursed without the submission of a 
receipt by employees represented by the Chautauqua County 
Sheriff's Employees' Association, Inc. (Association). 
In its answer to the charge, and in its exceptions before 
us, the County asserts that the requirement of a receipt is 
authorized by its collective bargaining agreement with the 
Association or, alternatively, that the receipt requirement is 
CASE NO. U-10715 
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simply a substitution of one manner of employee participation for 
another, and that, accordingly, no change in terms and conditions 
of employment took place upon implementation of the receipt 
requirement. 
The" County cites §§7.02 (a) and(b) and"7 7 05of—the- parties' 
collective bargaining agreement in support of its claim that 
requirement of a receipt is contractually authorized.—/ Taking 
-i/These sections provide as follows: 
Section 7.02 Meals 
(a) Field employees, subject to other 
provisions herein, shall be reimbursed up to a 
maximum of three dollars and fifty cents ($3.50) 
for meal expense. 
(b) The reimbursement allowance for any 
conference or committee meeting held within the 
county shall be up to a maximum of three dollars 
and fifty cents ($3.50), except that this may be 
exceeded only if a receipt is provided. 
Section 7.05 Forms of Claims 
All claims for personal expense shall regularly be 
on forms furnished by the Finance Department. A 
department head may require the use of a special 
form when approved by the Director of Finance. All 
such claims shall contain as a minimum the 
following information: 
(a) Specific nature of county business when expense is 
incurred. 
(b) Date, time and place where expense is incurred. 
(c) Point of departure and destination. 
(d) Travel authorization certificates shall be 
attached. 
(e) Registration fee of one hundred dollars ($100.00) 
is allowed pursuant to Section 77-b of the General 
Municipal Law for the attendance at a convention or 
school conducted for the betterment of county 
government. A receipt for this expense when 
presented to the Finance Department should indicate 
if it covers anything more than actual registration 
fee or tuition. 
,.'"> 
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these provisions together, we concur with the AKT's finding that 
a receipt for reimbursement of up to $3.50 for meal expense is 
not required by the parties' agreement. Indeed, the agreement 
makes specific reference to receipts in only two instances, when 
the Inear aTFo^anc 
fee of $100.00 is paid (§7.05(e)). The extent of the employees' 
contractual obligation with respect to payment for meal expenses 
is that a claim form be submitted identifying, among other 
things, the expense incurred. The parties' agreement does not 
require or authorize the submission of a receipt in addition to a 
claim form. The ALJ's finding that the collective bargaining 
agreement does not require receipts for all meals is accordingly 
affirmed. 
The County's next argument, that the extent of employee 
participation in the County's record-keeping is unchanged by the 
submission of a receipt and accordingly does not constitute a 
change in terms and conditions of employment, is also rejected. 
As we have previously held, a material change in the degree of 
employee participation in record-keeping may give rise to a 
finding of unilateral change in terms and conditions of 
employment (see, e.g. , Newburgh Enlarged CSD, 2 0 PERB [^3 053 
(1987)). In the instant case, the imposition of a receipt 
requirement as a condition of reimbursement for meals constitutes 
an additional item of record-keeping which places additional 
burdens upon unit members, who may receive emergency calls during 
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meals and who may utilize drive-through meal facilities which do 
not customarily provide receipts. The ALJ finding that a 
unilateral change in terms and conditions of employment took 
place is, accordingly, also affirmed. 
pynailyy"the County" asserts "that Article" VII,r-'SectiorT 8" of 
the New York State Constitution, which prohibits the use of 
public funds for the giving of gifts, authorizes the requirement 
of submission of a receipt for meal reimbursement. While it is 
indeed true, as the County asserts, that receipts would document 
that payments were in fact made in the amount of expenditures 
claimed, there is no evidence that either the New York State 
Constitution or §2 03 of the County Law, also cited by the County, 
necessarily requires submission of receipts, nor is there any 
evidence contained in the record which would establish that the 
requirement of receipts was necessitated by evidence that 
employees were not indeed expending the monies for meals which 
they recorded on claim forms submitted to the County for 
reimbursement. The County's argument that receipts for these 
expenditures are constitutionally mandated and that bargaining is 
accordingly neither necessary nor appropriate on the subject is 
therefore rejected. 
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the County violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act when it unilaterally implemented its 
directive of December 19, 1988 requiring submission of receipts 
as a condition of reimbursement for meals. 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the County: 
1. Reinstate the practice of reimbursing meals based upon 
submission of the travel expense claim, as it existed 
prior to January 1, 1989; 
2. Compensate" a±l—unitemployeeswho- lost—reimbursement 
because of the receipt requirement, with interest at 
the maximum legal rate; 
3. Negotiate in good faith with the Association with 
respect to terms and conditions of employment; and 
4. Post the attached notice conspicuously at all locations 
normally used by the County to communicate with unit 
employees. 
DATED: November 21, 1989 
Albany, New York 
J 
/Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memberf 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Chautauqua in the unit 
represented by the Chautauqua County Sheriff's Employees' 
Association, Inc., that the County of Chautauqua will: 
1. Reinstate the practice of "reimbursing meals 
based UDon submission of the travel expense 
claim, as it existed prior, to January 1, 1989; 
2. Compensate all unit employees who lost reimbursement 
because of the receipt requirement, with interest at 
the maximum legal rate; and 
3. Negotiate in good faith with the Association with 
respect to terms and conditions of employment. 
COUNTY OF CHAUTAUOUA 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN F. HERBERGER, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
CITY OF LOCKPORT and AFSCME, COUNCIL 66, 
Respondents. 
JOHN F. HERBERGER, pro se 
A. ANGELO DIMILLO, ESQ., DEPUTY CORPORATION COUNSEL, 
for Respondent City of Lockport 
JOEL M. POCH, ESQ., for Respondent AFSCME, Council 66 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
John F. Herberger (charging party) excepts to the 
dismissal on motion of his improper practice charge against 
the City of Lockport (City) and AFSCME, Council 66 (AFSCME) 
at the conclusion of charging party's case before the 
assigned Administrative Law Judge (AKJ). Dismissal of the 
charge followed two days of hearing at which the charging 
party testified and called witnesses on his behalf before 
resting his case. 
The charge alleges that the City violated §§209-a.l(a) 
and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it threatened the charging party on March 21, 1988, and 
when it terminated him on March 25, 1988, in retaliation for 
filing an improper practice charge against it. The charge 
CASE NO. U-10113 
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further alleges that AFSCME violated §2 09-a.2(a) of the Act 
by refusing to permit him to join the organization, by-
refusing to allow him to see its collective bargaining 
agreement with the City, and by threatening him with arrest 
if "he ""failed" to Itfithllraw^  
the charging party against it. 
The ALJ dismissed all charges against both respondents 
at the conclusion of the charging party's presentation for 
failure to present a prima facie case. The charging party 
excepts to the ALJ decision in a lengthy document, much of 
which presents information concerning events subsequent to 
the conclusion of the hearing in this matter, and which 
recites conversations in support of his charge which were not 
part of the record before the ALJ. Because we are limited to 
the evidence before the ALJ, we have not considered this 
material, and it does not form any part of the basis for our 
decision and order. 
The remainder of the charging party's exceptions relate 
to his assertion that he has indeed established a prima facie 
case and has thus shifted the burden of persuasion to the 
City and AFSCME. Each of the aspects of the charge and the 
evidence presented in support of a prima facie case will be 
addressed in turn. 
With respect to the allegations made by the charging 
party against the City, the evidence presented establishes 
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that the City terminated the charging party on March 25, 
1988. However, it fails to establish that the layoff, which, 
City employees testified (on behalf of the charging party), 
was occasioned by budgetary constraints and charging party's 
"temporary^ part-time"status,"had any"relationship to^any 
activity protected under the Act. Furthermore, neither the 
charging party, nor any other witness called by the charging 
party, testified to any threats by any City representative of 
retaliation for filing an improper practice charge against 
the City on March 18, 1988, or any other date. Indeed, the 
uncontroverted testimony presented by the charging party 
establishes that on March 21, 1988, when he alleges threats 
of retaliation were made, and on March 25, 1988, when 
charging party's layoff took place, City representatives were 
unaware that the charging party had filed an improper 
practice charge against the City. 
The charging party's failure to present any supporting 
evidence whatsoever, and, indeed, the presentation of 
evidence by him contradicting the allegations of the charge, 
warranted its dismissal as against the City. 1/ 
—/Although, as we held in County of Nassau (Police 
Department)
 r 17 PERB [^3 013 (1984), a charging party will be 
given the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from 
the record in considering a motion to dismiss, where, as 
here, no evidence whatsoever is presented from which such 
inferences could be drawn, dismissal at the close of the 
charging party's case is appropriate. 
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With respect to the charges against AFSCME, the record 
clearly and unequivocally discloses that the charging party 
was not entitled to union membership because he was not a 
member of the bargaining unit represented by AFSCME due to 
his" teTnporary, part-time- status. Furthermore, the record~is 
devoid of evidence that the charging party requested and was 
denied membership in AFSCME, even if AFSCME could have 
accepted him as a member. Nor is there any evidence that the 
charging party requested and was refused the opportunity to 
review the collective bargaining agreement between AFSCME and 
the City, even if he had been entitled to do so. Thus, these 
aspects of the charge against AFSCME were properly dismissed 
for failure to present a prima facie case. 
The remaining issue to be decided is whether the ALJ 
properly dismissed the aspect o'f the charge which alleges 
that an AFSCME representative threatened the charging party 
with arrest if he did not withdraw the improper practice 
charge which he had filed against AFSCME for its failure to 
admit him to membership. The ALJ dismissed this aspect of 
the charge upon a credibility determination resolving a 
conflict in testimony between the charging party and two 
witnesses called by him, both of whom denied that the threat, 
allegedly made in their presence, was actually made. 
Credibility determinations are generally to be reserved until 
the conclusion of an entire case, and the truth of the 
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charging party's evidence is generally to be assumed to be 
true for the purpose of deciding a motion to dismiss at the 
conclusion of the charging party's case. County of Nassau 
(Police Department), supra. However, under the highly 
u1nusliaT~ci^ 
conflict in the charging party's evidence precludes the 
making of an assumption of the truth of all of the charging 
party's evidence and requires the making of a credibility 
determination in order to resolve the conflict in testimony 
presented by the charging party, the making of a credibility 
determination necessary to decide the motion at the close of 
the charging party's case was appropriate. 
Having found that a credibility determination at the 
conclusion of the charging party's case, although unusual, 
was necessitated by the existence of a direct conflict in the 
charging party's evidence, we must determine whether the 
credibility resolution made by the ALT against the charging 
party and in favor of the two other witnesses called on his 
behalf should be affirmed. We find that it should, in 
keeping with the weight appropriately accorded to such 
credibility determinations by the trier of fact having the 
opportunity to observe and evaluate the demeanor of all 
witnesses. 
Based upon the foregoing, we find that dismissal of the 
charge against AFSCME at the conclusion of the charging 
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party's case is supported by the record, and IT IS THEREFORE 
ORDERED that the entire charge be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
"DATED: November 21, 19B9 
Albany, New York 
A/.&u^-n^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
UJJWZ-^* 
Walter L. E i senberg , Meijfber 
#2C-11/21/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALLEN WILLIAM LYNCH, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
AMALGAMATEDTRANSIT UNIOIT, LOCAL 1342/ 
Respondent. 
ALLEN WILLIAM LYNCH, pro se 
LIPSITZ, GREEN, FAHRINGER, ROLL, SCHULLER & JAMES, ESQS. 
(RONALD L. JAROS, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Allen William Lynch (charging party) excepts to the 
dismissal, after hearing, of his improper practice charge 
against the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1342 (ATU), 
which alleges that the ATU violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it requested, 
permitted, and participated in a System Wide Pick (SWP) 
pursuant to an agreement with the Niagara Frontier Transit 
Metro System, Inc. (employer), and when it failed to follow a 
majority opinion (expressed in a vote at a meeting on 
February 23, 1987) which sought the elimination of the SWP. 
The assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found, after 
receiving numerous exhibits, stipulations of fact and 
CASE NO. U-9712 
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testimony, the following essential facts.i/ 
The ATU and employer entered into a collective 
bargaining agreement covering the period August, 198 3 to 
July, 1986. This agreement included certain seniority 
defihitiohs appricable to" aThumber of beBeTits, lhcludihg 
vacation selection, assignment selection, and other matters. 
On August 1, 1984, the parties entered into a Memorandum 
of Agreement setting forth provisions for the initial 
staffing, selection and training of individuals to fill new 
jobs created in connection with the operation and maintenance 
of the employer's planned rail operation, established under 
the Urban Mass Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §1600 et seq. 
The Memorandum of Agreement, which was voted upon and 
ratified by the membership of the ATU in 1984, included 
provision for an SWP which, in essence, modified the 
seniority definitions contained in the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement. The Agreement further provided that the 
SWP would be conducted by the employer within 9 0 days after 
completion and staffing of the rail system. 
Although the SWP agreement was coterminous with the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement, the ATU membership, 
at a meeting in May or June 1986, voted to continue in effect 
i/The ALJ decision sets forth a detailed statement of 
facts which will not be repeated here, except as necessary to 
place our holdings in proper context. See Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Local 1342, 22 PERB [^4568 (1989) . 
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the SWP agreement, thereby extending it for an unstated 
period of time. Thereafter, in February 1987, at a 
membership meeting, a motion was made to rescind the 1986 
vote and eliminate the SWP agreement. That vote was ruled by 
the ATtr Local President plresidihg to^req 
Robert's Rules of Order, a two-thirds vote which was not 
achieved. 
In the meantime, on December 11, 1986, the employer's 
rail operation was completed, triggering the 90-day period 
for establishment of an SWP. During the 90-day period, the 
ATU's Local President requested that the SWP take place, and 
it was in fact commenced on April 6, 1987, 26 days after the 
expiration of the 90-day period during which the parties* SWP 
agreement contemplated that the SWP would be conducted. 
The charging party asserts that he was adversely 
affected by the modified seniority arrangement created by the 
SWP, when it was finally put in place on or about 
September 6, 1987. 
At the outset, we note that the charging party makes an 
allegation both in his charge and exceptions before us, that 
§13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. 
§1609(c)) assures both the continuation of collective 
bargaining rights and the protection of individual employees 
against a worsening of their positions with respect to their 
employment as a result of application of the other provisions 
Board - U-9712 
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of the Urban Mass Transportation Act, and that his employment 
conditions with respect, in particular, to seniority, have 
been worsened in violation of that federal statutory 
protection. This allegation is not properly before us, both 
b_eoaxi"se"~th"e"~"reoord"-'e"st:a"bl^ sh"e"s~irh"at-i^ ~"ha'S"pirev±OTasly""-b"e"eTr"^ a 
matter of litigation between these same parties in another 
forum, and because it is not for us to decide whether this 
section of Federal law has been violated, particularly where, 
as here, there is no evidence that the alleged violation of 
§13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act was otherwise 
violative of the ATU's duty of fair representation under the 
Act.-2-/ 
It is well established that a breach of the duty of fair 
representation is established only by proving that an 
employee organization's decisions, including those which 
adversely affect some portion of its membership, were made in 
an arbitrary manner, for discriminatory reasons, or in bad 
faith. The long accepted broad latitude given employee 
organizations in the negotiations process^/ is particularly 
understood in the negotiation of seniority provisions in 
which, by definition, some employees are advantaged and 
2JSee, e. cr. , Amalgamated Transit Union v. Louisville and 
Jefferson County Transit Authority, 659 F.2d 722, at 724 (6th 
Cir. 1981) , wherein the Court held that "federal courts have 
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain cases arising under 
§13(c) agreements and the UMTA." 
37See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 31 LRRM 
2548 (1953). 
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others are not. As we have held: "[T]he duty of fair 
representation does not preclude an employee organization 
from reaching agreements in negotiations that are more 
favorable to some unit employees than to others." UFT ' 
Local 27 AFT 7 AFL-CIO 7 18' Mia'f 3 048 V~a^3r(35 T1985 f; See' 
also State of New York and PEF, 14 PERB [^3043 (1981) ; 
Plainview-Old Bethpage CSD, 7 PERB ^3058 (1974). 
The evidence before us is limited to the facts that the 
ATU entered into an agreement which had some adverse impact 
upon the charging party, waived the time limit within which 
compliance by the employer was required by the agreement, and 
declined to void the agreement, notwithstanding an expression 
of interest by a majority of persons present at a union 
meeting that it do so. Whether the ATU could have avoided 
application of the ratified SWP Memorandum of Agreement is 
not before us. What is before us is whether its election not 
to seek to do so constitutes a breach of the duty of fair 
representation. We find that it does not. An employee 
organization is entitled to latitude and discretion in the 
negotiation and administration of agreements with employers. 
The exercise of that discretion in the instant case has not 
been affirmatively shown by the charging party to have been 
arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith, nor were the actions 
of the ATU so patently unreasonable or overreaching as to 
warrant an adverse inference of such. Indeed, as the ALT 
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found, the actions of the ATU were taken upon due 
deliberation and in good faith. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: November 21, 1989 
Albany, New York 
2Z2&^' 
'/ Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membei/ 
